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Abstract
We reveal a contradiction in measure-theoretic probability. The contradiction is an “equation”
1/2 = 0 with its two sides representing probabilities. Unlike known paradoxes in mathematics, the
revealed contradiction cannot be explained away and actually indicates that measure-theoretic prob-
ability is inconsistent. Appearing only in the theory, the contradiction does not exist in the physical
world. So practical applications of measure-theoretic probability will not be affected by the incon-
sistency as long as “ideal events” in the theory (which will never occur physically) are not mistaken
for real events in the physical world. Nevertheless, the inconsistency must be resolved. Construc-
tive mathematics can avoid such inconsistency. There is no contradiction reported in constructive
mathematics.
1 Introduction
Known paradoxes in mathematics are either considered issues of mathematical logic [1], or treated
as deducible statements which are counterintuitive but true [6, 10], where “true” implies “without
contradiction”. Treating deducible statements as results without contradiction is not grounded on
mathematical justification. Such treatment is usually based on a popular belief, i.e., mathematics
is free from contradiction as it is. The belief is an issue of mathematical philosophy, which is not
our concern. In this paper, we show that a contradictory “equation” 1/2 = 0 is deducible in measure-
theoretic probability, where the two sides of the “equation” represent probabilities. Unlike the paradoxes
discussed in [6, 10], the contradictory “equation” cannot be explained away and actually indicates that
measure-theoretic probability is inconsistent.
After a brief discussion about why measure-theoretic probability is very successful and yet inconsis-
tent (Section 2), we review some key notions relevant to revealing the inconsistency, such as inadequacy
of the σ-algebra generated by coordinate variables of stochastic processes (Section 3), weak convergence
and tightness of probability measures on the σ-algebra B(R) of subsets of the real line R (Section 4),
weak convergence of probability measures on the σ-algebra B(R) of subsets of the extended real line
R (Section 5), and the difference between probabilities and numbers in the closed unit interval [0, 1]
(Section 6), in particular, the difference between limiting probabilities and limits of sequences in [0, 1]
(Section 7). Based on the above preparation, we demonstrate the deducibility of the contradictory
“equation” 1/2 = 0 (Section 8). We conclude in Section 9.
∗Corresponding author (alternative e-mail address: guanglli@hotmail.com). 2010 Mathematics Subject Classification:
Primary 60A05.
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2 Measure-Theoretic Probability: Success and Inconsistency
For measure-theoretic probability, the ultimate criterion of success is whether the probability of a
real event (i.e., an event in the physical world) predicted by the theory can be verified empirically. By
this criterion, measure-theoretic probability is very successful. And yet, measure-theoretic probability
is inconsistent, as we shall demonstrate. How can measure-theoretic probability be both successful and
inconsistent? A brief answer is as follows. As a consequence of “ideal events”, the inconsistency of
measure-theoretic probability appears only in the theory, but not in the physical world. Expressed as
an infinite union or intersection of different events of positive probability, an “ideal event” is a result of
infinitely repeated or infinitely fine operations.
Example 1 An absolutely accurate measurement of a physical quantity with its relative magnitude
represented by an irrational number is an ideal event. Corresponding to picking up a point from a set
with the cardinality of the continuum, such measurement requires infinitely fine operations, and hence
is not physically realizable. 
The criterion of success of measure-theoretic probability implies a constraint: Since “ideal events”
do not exist physically, or since it is impossible to verify the existence of “ideal events” in the physical
world, physical existence of theoretical properties derived by manipulating probabilities of “ideal events”
should not be inferred from experiments. This constraint serves as a “firewall” of measure-theoretic
probability. When the constraint is satisfied, it is safe to apply measure-theoretic probability to solve
problems in the real world. In practice, however, violating the constraint can cause confusion of real
and ideal events. A typical violation is to use a finite set of experimental data to “prove” or “verify”
physical existence of theoretical properties obtained by calculating probabilities of “ideal events”.
3 Inadequacy of σ-Algebra Generated by Coordinate Variables
A real-valued random variable is usually described by the probability measure (i.e., the distribution)
induced by the random variable on the real line R. In general, a stochastic process is usually described
by the probability measures (i.e., the finite-dimensional distributions) induced by the process in k-
dimensional Euclidean spaces Rk, k = 1, 2, · · · . The construction of a process in measure-theoretic
probability begins with a given system of finite-dimensional distributions. However, the system of
finite-dimensional distributions may not completely capture the properties of a process [3].
A stochastic process is a collection of real-valued random variables labeled by an index variable taking
values from a set T . The points in the set T usually represent time. We consider only T = {1, 2, · · · }.
Denote by RT the set of all real sequences. For each n ∈ T , define a mapping Wn : R
T → R by
Wn(ω) = ω(n) = ωn.
For a given n ∈ T , the mapping Wn (also referred to as a coordinate function) maps a real sequence
ω ∈ RT to the nth coordinate ω(n) = ωn of ω. We may also write Wn(ω) as W (n, ω). For a fixed ω,
W (·, ω) = ω(·) is just ω itself. Denote by B(RT ) the σ-algebra (also referred to as σ-field) generated
by all the coordinate functions Wn, n ∈ T : B(R
T ) = σ{Wn : n ∈ T}, which is the intersection of all the
σ-algebras containing the sets of the form
{ω ∈ RT :Wn(ω) ∈ H} = {ω ∈ R
T : ωn ∈ H}
for n ∈ T and H ∈ B(R). In other words, B(RT ) is the “smallest” class of the sets which is closed under
the finite and countable set-theoretic operations.
Let RT be a sample space represented by Ω, and let a probability measure be defined on B(RT ).
Now ω ∈ Ω = RT represents a sample point, and Wn can be interpreted as the nth coordinate variable
Un of a random sequence (Un)n≥1. A realization of (Un)n≥1 at a given sample point ω is a real sequence
(Un(ω))n≥1, which can also be expressed as U(·, ω) and is just ω itself.
If (Un)n≥1 is a non-decreasing random sequence, Un(ω) may tend to infinity as n → ∞ at some
ω. Since {∞} 6∈ B(RT ), a probability measure on the measurable space (RT ,B(RT )) is not useful to
describe the limiting behavior of (Un)n≥1. Clearly, to define the limiting random variable of (Un)n≥1 on a
probability space, the limiting random variable should be measurable with respect to the corresponding
probability measure, which requires the values of the limiting random variable to form a measurable
set on the probability space. Fortunately, the probability measures ρn induced by Un constitute a
sequence (ρn)n≥1 such that, corresponding to (Un)n≥1 and (ρn)n≥1, a limiting random variable U and
a limiting probability measure ρ induced by U exist on the extended real line R and the corresponding
σ-algebra B(R), respectively. For a convergent sequence of probability measures, the corresponding
random variables can be on different probability spaces [4]. Consequently, convergence of probability
measures does not require the involved random variables to form a convergent sequence on the same
probability space. Convergence of probability measures on B(R) is a generalization of convergence of
probability measures on B(R). If a sequence of probability measures converges on B(R), the sequence
is necessarily tight on B(R). We shall review these notions in the next two sections.
4 Weak Convergence and Tightness of Probability Measures on B(R)
Let (ρn)n≥1 be a sequence of probability measures on B(R). The probability measures ρn are
distributions induced by real-valued random variables Un, such that Un converge in distribution to a
limiting random variable U as n → ∞ (notation Un ⇒ U). Equivalently, the probability measures ρn
converge weakly to a limiting probability measure ρ induced by U (notation ρn ⇒ ρ). If (Un)n≥1 is non-
decreasing, U may take ∞ as its value with positive probability, i.e., ρ may assign positive probability
to {∞}. One way to define convergence in distribution of a sequence of real random variables is
by convergence of the corresponding distribution functions at each continuous point of the limiting
distribution function, which may not necessarily be a distribution function of a real random variable
[7]. This definition has some disadvantages, for example, see [8].
An equivalent definition of weak convergence of probability measures (i.e., convergence in distribu-
tion of the corresponding random variables) is as follows [4, 8]. Suppose R is the common range for all
the random variables involved. The sequence (ρn)n≥1 of probability measures induced by the random
variables converges weakly to a probability measure ρ, if and only if for each f ∈ Cb(R),∫
R
fdρn →
∫
R
fdρ, n→∞
where Cb(R) is the class of bounded, continuous functions on R. Clearly, such convergence is not only
a property of the probability measures ρn or corresponding random variables Un, but also relevant to
the common range space of the involved random variables on which weak convergence is defined. If the
common range space is defined to be R, and if the limiting random variable is not real-valued, then weak
convergence or convergence in distribution as defined above does not hold, even if a limiting random
variable and the corresponding probability measure exist on R and B(R), respectively.
Example 2 Let (Un)n≥1 be a sequence of degenerate random variables such that Un = n. The distri-
bution, i.e., the probability measure ρn induced by Un is the Dirac measure concentrated at {n}. As
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n → ∞, Un ⇒ U = ∞ ∈ R and ρn ⇒ ρ where ρ is the Dirac measure concentrated on {∞} ∈ B(R).
But (Un)n≥1 does not converge on R, and (ρn)n≥1 does not converge weakly on B(R). 
On the one hand, as illustrated by the above example, for a sequence of probability measures,
mass may “escape to infinity” as n → ∞, and meanwhile, in an extended sense, the notion of limiting
probability measure remains meaningful. In particular, for a non-decreasing random sequence such as
(Un)n≥1 in Example 2, a unique limiting random variable exists, which may not necessarily be real-
valued. By Helly’s selection theorem (e.g., see [3]), the limiting random variable has unique distribution
function and probability measure, such that the limiting distribution function may have a lower bound
larger than 0 or an upper bound less than 1, and the limiting probability measure ρ is on B(R) and may
be a subprobability measure when restricted to B(R), i.e., ρ(R) < 1. The cause of ρ(R) < 1 is mass
“escaping to infinity”.
On the other hand, probability measures defined on B(R) are particularly important for measure-
theoretic probability and its applications. To prevent mass from “escaping to infinity”, a condition must
be imposed on a sequence of probability measures before we consider whether the sequence converges
to a limiting probability measure on B(R).
Tightness of probability measures on B(R) is the condition to prevent mass from “escaping to
infinity”. If a sequence of probability measures (ρn)n≥1 is tight on (R,B(R)), then for each ǫ > 0,
there is an interval Iǫ ⊂ R, such that supn ρn(I
c
ǫ ) < ǫ where I
c
ǫ = R \ Iǫ. If such a tight sequence of
probability measures (ρn)n≥1 converges weakly to ρ, then the weak limit ρ is also a probability measure
on (R,B(R)). Given f ∈ Cb(R), even if f(x) does not converge as x→ ±∞, so long as (ρn)n≥1 is tight
on (R,B(R)) and ρn ⇒ ρ, we have ρ({±∞}) = 0 and
∫
R
fdρ exists. Suppose ρn ⇒ ρ. If not only all
ρn but also ρ are required to be probability measures on (R,B(R)), then (ρn)n≥1 is necessarily tight on
(R,B(R)).
Example 3 Let λ, λn, n = 1, 2, · · · be probability measures on (R,B(R)), such that λ, λ1, λ2, · · · are
distributions of i.i.d. random variables X,X1,X2, · · · , respectively. The probability mass functions of
X and Xn are the same:
λ({j}) = λn({j}) =


1/2, j = 0
1/2, j = 1
0, otherwise.
If we define λ({±∞}) = λn({±∞}) = 0, then λ, λn, n = 1, 2, · · · are also probability measures on
(R,B(R)) trivially. The sequence (λn)n≥1 is tight on (R,B(R)), and converges weakly to λ. Equivalently,
Xn converge in distribution to X. 
Example 4 Consider a random sequence (Zn)n≥1. Denote by µn the probability measure (i.e., the
distribution) induced by Zn, and let the probability mass function of Zn be
µn({j}) =


2−(n−j+1), 1 ≤ j < n
2−1 + 2−n, j = n
0, otherwise.
(1)
For each n, Zn+1 takes larger values with larger probabilities. The values of Zn+1 include n+1 and all
the values of Zn.
The sequence (µn)n≥1 is not tight on (R,B(R)). To see this, consider ǫ = 2
−1. By (1), for all n,
µn({n}) = 2
−1 + 2−n > 2−1. In particular, for all real number b > 0 and all n > Nb, µn({n}) > 2
−1,
where Nb = ⌈b⌉, and ⌈b⌉ is the smallest integer larger than or equal to b. Consequently, for each interval
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Figure 1. For any fixed k ≥ 0, mass at {n− k} “escapes to infinity” as n→∞, so µ(R) = 0.
Ib = (−∞, b), supn µn(I
c
b ) > 2
−1. The probability mass function (1) explains not only why (µn)n≥1 fails
to be tight on (R,B(R)) but also where all the mass goes as n → ∞. For a fixed j, limn µn({j}) = 0.
To see what happens when j increases with n, write j = n − k, where 0 ≤ k < n is fixed. We then
have µn({n − k}) = 1/2
k+1 for k > 0 and µn({n}) = 2
−1 + 2−n. Since (n − k) → ∞ as n → ∞,
1/2k+1, k = 1, 2, · · · constitute one half of the mass that “escapes to infinity”. The other half of the
mass at {∞} in the limit as n→∞ comes from µn({n}). Let a vertical line segment of length µn({j}) at
j represent the mass assigned to {j} by µn. As n→∞, the length of the segment at a fixed j diminishes
towards 0, the segment at j = n − k with a fixed 0 < k < n maintains an unchanged length 2−(k+1),
and the length of the segment at n is 2−1 + 2−n, which decreases gradually to 1/2. Figure 1 illustrates
the case for k > 0 with n = 2 and 3. The total “escaped” mass then is
∑
k≥0 1/2
k+1 = 1. Actually,
by Helly’s theorem, each subsequence of (µn)n≥1 converges to a subprobability measure µ on (R,B(R))
such that µ(R) = 0, for µ(R) > 0 contradicts (1). So µn ⇒ µ where µ is the Dirac measure on (R,B(R))
with µ({∞}) = 1. Equivalently, Zn ⇒ Z, where Z is the extended random variable corresponding to
µ. When restricted to (R,B(R)), µ is a zero measure. 
As we shall see later, (λn)n≥1 in Example 3 has an intrinsic connection to (µn)n≥1 in Example 4,
though the former is tight on (R,B(R)) and the latter is not.
5 Weak Convergence of Probability Measures on B(R)
The definition of ρn ⇒ ρ can be generalized such that, for each n, ρn is still a probability measure
on (R,B(R)), but (ρn)n≥1 may not be tight on (R,B(R)), and ρ is a probability measure on (R,B(R))
with ρ({±∞}) > 0 (see Example 2). In the above generalized definition of ρn ⇒ ρ, Cb(R) in the original
definition is replaced by C(R), the class of continuous functions on R. The reason for such replacement
is shown by the example below. Let 1A represent the indicator function, i.e.,
1A(x) =
{
1, x ∈ A
0, otherwise.
Example 5 Consider (ρn)n≥1 such that ρn is the Dirac measure concentrated at {n} as in Example 2.
The distribution function corresponding to ρn is 1[n,∞)(·) with 1[n,∞)(x)→ 0 as n→∞ for limn[n,∞) =
∩n[n,∞) = ∅. By Helly’s selection theorem and the generalized definition of ρn ⇒ ρ, ρ is the Dirac
measure concentrated at {∞}. However, for some f ∈ Cb(R) such as f = sin,
∫
R
fdρn = f(n) = sin(n),
which does not converge as n→∞. 
Let R be equipped with a topology induced by a fixed metric. A function from one metric space
to another is called a homeomorphism if the function is continuous, one-to-one, onto, and its inverse
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function is also continuous. If such a function exists, then the two metric spaces are said to be home-
omorphic. With a homeomorphism from R onto [0, 1], C(R) can be identified with C([0, 1]), the space
of continuous functions on [0, 1].
Example 6 A homeomorphism h : R→ [0, 1] from R onto [0, 1] is
h(x) =


0, x = −∞
1− π−1 cot−1(x), x ∈ R
1, x =∞.
The inverse of h is h−1 : [0, 1]→ R given by
h−1(y) =


−∞, y = 0
cot(π(1 − y)), y ∈ (0, 1)
∞, y = 1.
A usual metric on R is d(x, y) = | tan−1(x)− tan−1(y)|. 
Each f ∈ C([0, 1]) has limits at the boundary points. Weak convergence of probability measures on
B(R) can then be identified with weak convergence of probability measures on B([0, 1]) (the σ-algebra of
subsets of [0, 1]), and hence a limiting probability measure on B([0, 1]) which assigns mass to a boundary
point of [0, 1] is identified with the corresponding limiting probability measure on B(R) which assigns
the same amount of mass to {∞}. Since the probability measures on B([0, 1]) may not necessarily be
tight on B((0, 1)) (the σ-algebra of subsets of (0, 1)), weak convergence of such probability measures on
B([0, 1]) does not necessarily imply tightness of the corresponding probability measures on B(R).
Example 7 Consider (Zn)n≥1 in Example 4 again. Write Z
′
n = h(Zn) where h is given in Example 6.
Denote by µ′n the probability measure induced by Z
′
n. As n → ∞, Zn ⇒ Z. Accordingly Z
′
n ⇒ Z
′.
Let µ′ be the probability measure induced by Z ′. Now µ′n ⇒ µ
′ on ([0, 1],B([0, 1])) corresponds to
µn ⇒ µ on (R,B(R)). Consequently, µ
′({1}) = 1 and µ′((0, 1)) = 0 correspond to µ({∞}) = 1 and
µ(R) = 0, respectively. Although R and [0, 1] are homeomorphic, (µn)n≥1 is still not tight on (R,B(R)).
Clearly, the correspondence between Z ′ = 1 and Z = ∞ does not imply that Z ′ and Z are equivalent
in magnitude. The trivial tightness of (µ′n)n≥1 on ([0, 1],B([0, 1]) will not change the fact that (µn)n≥1
is not tight on (R,B(R)). 
6 Probabilities and Real Numbers in [0, 1]
The notion of real numbers and the notion of probability can both be formulated axiomatically.
However, the axioms for real numbers cannot formulate the notion of probability. As a set function in
measure-theoretic probability formulated by the axioms of probability, a probability measure assigns
a numerical probability (also referred to as probability mass) represented by a number in the closed
unit interval [0, 1] to an event characterized by a measurable set on a probability space. The numerical
probability quantifies the possibility of the event. In other words, associated with a measurable set on
a specified probability space, a (numerical) probability describes quantitatively how likely an event will
occur. Real numbers without the constraint imposed by the axioms of probability do not have such
unique property of probabilities. Therefore, a number in [0, 1] is not necessarily a probability of an event
on a given probability space. Probabilities must comply with the constraint imposed by the axioms of
probability. Numbers in [0, 1] are not necessarily subject to such constraint. Consequently, although
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the amount or relative magnitude of a probability is represented by a real number in [0, 1], probabilities
cannot be treated as such numbers.
Real numbers are an ordered field. In such a field, comparison of real numbers is defined by the
axioms of order. “Possibility” is a quantifiable attribute of an event. Probabilities are compared as
quantified possibilities. Since the amount of a probability is represented by a real number in [0, 1],
comparing probabilities is equivalent to comparing their amounts. In contrast, if a real number in [0, 1]
fails to comply with the axioms of probability, then the number is not a quantified possibility of an
event on the underlying probability space, and hence is not a probability. Comparing such a number
with a probability is meaningless. Such comparison is not defined by the axioms for either probability
or real numbers. Actually, relations on R such as <,>,=,≤ and ≥ are all defined for and only for
real numbers, where real numbers are merely “points” in the ordered field. No other interpretation is
attached to such abstract points.
Example 8 Unit probability is a unique quantity for indicating certainty or almost sure occurrence
of an event. In contrast, the real number “1” is merely a point in an absolute space R formulated as
a set based on the axioms of real numbers without any other interpretation. “An event occurs with
probability 1” is certainly a meaningful statement. However, if “with probability 1” is replaced by
“with the real number 1”, the statement “an event occurs with the real number 1” is meaningless. Unit
probability and the real number “1” are of the same amount, but not of the same kind, and hence not
comparable. 
Example 9 From information theory we can also see the difference between probabilities and numbers
in [0, 1]. As shown in information theory, the notion of probability is closely related to the notion of
“information”. Without the constraint imposed by the axioms of probability, numbers in [0, 1] have no
such connection to “information”. 
Nevertheless, since the amount of a probability is represented by a real number in [0, 1], according
to the axioms of real numbers, we can still compare the amount of a probability with a real number.
However, when making such comparison, we must keep in mind that a probability and its amount (i.e.,
its relative magnitude represented by a real number) are different.
An operation defined on a set is said to be “closed” with respect to a given property of some or all
elements in the set, if every result of the operation is an element of the set and possesses the property.
The values of probabilities are represented by numbers in [0, 1]. However, although operations defined for
numbers in [0, 1] may be closed with respect to numbers, i.e., results of such operations are also numbers,
the operations may not necessarily be closed with respect to probabilities. Any closed operation defined
for probabilities must obey the axioms of probability. This requirement will not change the closeness of
an operation defined for numbers. When a closed operation defined for numbers violates the axioms of
probability, the result of the operation is not a probability, but is still a number.
Example 10 A probability space has four elementary events represented by ωi with probabilities
P ({ωi}) = 1/8, i = 1, 2, 3, and P ({ω4}) = 5/8.
For A = {ω1, ω2} and B = {ω2, ω3}, the condition for P (A) and P (B) to be additive is violated by
A∩B 6= ∅. Consequently P (A)+P (B) = 1/2 is not a probability of any event on the probability space.
Nevertheless, as the sum of two numbers, P (A) + P (B) is still a number. 
Let ρ and ρn, n = 1, 2, · · · be probability measures on a common measurable space (R,B(R)), such
that ρn ⇒ ρ, i.e., ρn converges weakly to ρ as n→∞, where ρ({−∞}) = 0 and ρn(R) = 1 for each n. Let
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α and αn, n = 1, 2, · · · be measurable sets in B(R), such that α = limn αn, n→∞, αn ∈ B(R) ⊂ B(R),
and ρn(αn) < 1 for all n. Suppose limn ρn(αn) exists. If α = R, and if limn ρn(αn) is treated as the limit
of a real sequence, i.e., if limn ρn(αn) is interpreted as limn[ρn(αn)], then the result of such treatment
may not necessarily be a probability.
Example 11 Let ρn be µn as given in Example 4. Suppose αn = I(xn) = (−∞, xn]. Consider
xn = n− 1.
ρn(αn) = µn(I(n− 1)) =
n−1∑
j=1
µn({j}) =
n−1∑
j=1
(
1
2n−j+1
)
=
1
2
−
1
2n
.
Suppose limn µn(I(n− 1)) is treated as
lim
n→∞
[µn(I(n− 1))] = lim
n→∞
(
1
2
−
1
2n
)
=
1
2
.
However, no set in B(R) is assigned one half of unit mass by any of the involved probability measures
µ, µ1, µ2, · · · . So limn[µn(I(n − 1))] = 1/2 is not a probability, and the operation of taking limit is not
closed with respect to probabilities. Nevertheless, limn[µn(I(n − 1))] = 1/2 is still the limit of a real
sequence. The operation of taking limit remains to be closed with respect to numbers for any convergent
sequence in [0, 1]. 
7 Limiting Probabilities on B(R) and Limits of Real Sequences in [0, 1]
Limiting probabilities are not necessarily limits of probabilities. The former must be probabilities.
But the latter may or may not be probabilities. A limiting probability is determined by the correspond-
ing limiting measure and event. The event may not necessarily be a continuity set of the limiting measure
[4]. Suppose ρn ⇒ ρ and limn αn = α where for all n, ρn(R) = 1 and ρn(αn) < 1 with αn ∈ B(R), ρ
is a probability measure on B(R) with ρ({−∞}) = 0, and α ∈ B(R). If limn ρn(αn) is a probability,
limn[ρn(αn)] may not necessarily be a probability. There is a subtle difference between limn ρn(αn) and
limn[ρn(αn)]. As shown in Example 4 and Example 11, if ρ(R) = 0 and if limn[ρn(αn)] > 0 exists, then
limn[ρn(αn)] is not a probability. On the other hand, if ρ(R) = 1, then limn[ρn(αn)] is also a probability
and coincides with limn ρn(αn). A limiting probability cannot always be expressed as the limit of a
real sequence. Taking limit for a real sequence is not necessarily a closed operation with respect to
probabilities. Nevertheless, the definition of the limit of a real sequence remains unchanged, even if the
limit is not a probability. We shall prove the above claims in this section. The case 0 < ρ(R) < 1 may
be reduced to ρ′(R) = 1 where ρ′ = ρ/ρ(R) such that ρ′n ⇒ ρ
′ and ρ′n = ρn/ρn(R) [7].
To clarify the ambiguity about limn ρn(αn), we introduce a mapping. Let ψ be a probability measure
on B(R), and η a measurable set in B(R). Denote by P a mapping, which maps (ψ, η) to ψ(η), i.e.,
P(ψ, η) = ψ(η). With P, limn[ρn(αn)] can be expressed by limn P(ρn, αn). If limn ρn(αn) is a
probability, we use [limn ρn(αn)]m and [limn ρn(αn)]s to represent the respective probability measure
and measurable set which produce limn ρn(αn).
Remark 1 In general, the argument of [·]m and [·]s corresponds to a procedure for calculating a prob-
ability. The procedure may simply be a specific probability assignment such as ψ(η), or is given by an
expression for computing a limiting probability, which can eventually be reduced to the form of ρ(α),
where ρ is the measure of the limiting probability and α the associated ρ-measurable set, determined
respectively by weak convergence of the sequence of involved probability measures ρn and the corre-
sponding measurable sets αn in the context. Procedures for calculating limiting probabilities may not
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necessarily be the same as those for calculating limits of real sequences. A procedure for calculating the
limit of a real sequence may not necessarily yield a limiting probability as shown by Example 11. 
Lemma 1 Suppose ρn ⇒ ρ with ρ({−∞}) = 0, limn αn = α, and ρn(αn) < 1 with αn ∈ B(R) and
ρn(R) = 1 for all n.
(a) If limn ρn(αn) is a probability,
lim
n→∞
ρn(αn) = P (ρ, α) .
(b) If both limn ρn(αn) and limn P(ρn, αn) are probabilities,
lim
n→∞
ρn(αn) = P (ρ, α) = lim
n→∞
P(ρn, αn).
Proof: (a) If limn ρn(αn) is a probability, then from ρn ⇒ ρ and limn αn = α we have
[
lim
n→∞
ρn(αn)
]
m
= ρ and
[
lim
n→∞
ρn(αn)
]
s
= α.
Immediately from the definitions of [·]m, [·]s and P,
lim
n→∞
ρn(αn) =
[
lim
n→∞
ρn(αn)
]
m
([
lim
n→∞
ρn(αn)
]
s
)
= ρ(α) = P(ρ, α).
(b) If limn ρn(αn) and limn P(ρn, αn) are both probabilities, we also have [limn P(ρn, αn)]m = ρ,
[limn P(ρn, αn)]s = α, and
lim
n→∞
P(ρn, αn) =
[
lim
n→∞
P(ρn, αn)
]
m
([
lim
n→∞
P(ρn, αn)
]
s
)
= ρ(α) = P(ρ, α)
which together with (a) proves (b). 
Thus, if limn ρn(αn) is a probability, a general expression, or so to speak, a synonym of limn ρn(αn)
is P(ρ, α).
Remark 2 By Lemma 1, given ρn ⇒ ρ and limn αn = α, if both limn ρn(αn) and limn[ρn(αn)] are
probabilities, then they can be expressed respectively as P(ρ, α) and limn P(ρn, αn), and the order of
applying P and taking limit is interchangeable. Labeled by a single index variable n, limn ρn(αn) is not
a double limit. A double limit involves a double sequence labeled by two independent index variables
(e.g., (aij)i≥1,j≥1). Issues about a double limit, such as whether different orders of taking limit will
yield the same result, are irrelevant to limn ρn(αn). 
The following is a variant of Lemma 1 in some specific settings with αn = I(xn) = (−∞, xn], where
(xn)n≥1 is a real sequence, such that ρn(I(xn)) < 1 for all n, and as n→∞, xn ↑ ∞ or xn → x ∈ R.
Lemma 2 Assume that limn ρn(I(xn)) is a probability, ρn ⇒ ρ with ρ({−∞}) = 0, and ρn(I(xn)) < 1
for all n.
(a) If xn → x ∈ R as n→∞ where ρ({x}) = 0, then limn P(ρn, I(xn)) is a probability, and
lim
n→∞
ρn(I(xn)) = P(ρ, I(x)) = lim
n→∞
P(ρn, I(xn))
where I(x) = limn I(xn) = (−∞, x].
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(b) Suppose xn ↑ ∞ as n→∞. Then
lim
n→∞
ρn(I(xn)) = P(ρ,R) ≤ 1.
If (ρn)n≥1 is tight on (R,B(R)) and if limn P(ρn, I(xn)) is a probability,
lim
n→∞
P(ρn, I(xn)) = P(ρ,R) = 1.
If (ρn)n≥1 is not tight on (R,B(R)), then limn P(ρn, I(xn)) (if the limit exists) is not a probability, and
P(ρ,R) = 1− ρ({∞}) < 1.
Proof: (a) Since ρn ⇒ ρ and since xn → x ∈ R, given ǫ > 0, there exists an Nǫ such that for all
n ≥ Nǫ,
|ρn(I(xn))− ρ(I(x))| ≤ |ρn(I(xn))− ρn(I(x))| + |ρn(I(x)) − ρ(I(x))| < ǫ/2 + ǫ/2 = ǫ.
So
lim
n→∞
P(ρn, I(xn)) = ρ(I(x)) = P(ρ, I(x)).
On the other hand,
lim
n→∞
ρn(I(xn)) =
[
lim
n→∞
ρn(I(xn))
]
m
([
lim
n→∞
ρn(I(xn))
]
s
)
= ρ(I(x)).
This completes the proof of (a).
(b) Since limn I(xn) = ∪n≥1I(xn) = R,
lim
n→∞
ρn(I(xn)) =
[
lim
n→∞
ρn(I(xn))
]
m
([
lim
n→∞
ρn(I(xn))
]
s
)
= ρ(R) = P(ρ,R) ≤ 1.
If (ρn)n≥1 is tight on (R,B(R)), no mass “escapes to infinity” in probability assignment given by ρ, and
hence P(ρ,R) = 1. Moreover, for each ǫ > 0, there is an interval Ib(ǫ) = (−∞, b(ǫ)], such that
sup
n≥1
ρn
(
Icb(ǫ)
)
= sup
n≥1
P
(
ρn, I
c
b(ǫ)
)
< ǫ
where Ic
b(ǫ) = R \ Ib(ǫ). For all n ≥ Nǫ where Nǫ = min{n ∈ N : xn > b(ǫ)}, I(xn) ⊃ Ib(ǫ), I
c(xn)(=
R \ I(xn)) ⊂ I
c
b(ǫ), and hence
P(ρn, I
c(xn)) ≤ P
(
ρn, I
c
b(ǫ)
)
≤ sup
n≥1
P
(
ρn, I
c
b(ǫ)
)
< ǫ.
In other words, P(ρn, I
c(xn))→ 0 as n→∞. Consequently, P(ρn, I(xn))→ 1.
Now assume that (ρn)n≥1 is not tight on (R,B(R)). In probability assignment given by ρn for each
n, mass must be conserved on the extended real line. Consequently
ρn(I(xn)) = ρn(R)− ρn(I
c(xn))− ρn({∞}). (2)
Note ρn(I
c(xn)) + ρn({∞}) = ρn(R \ I(xn)). In (2), ρn({∞}) = 0 and ρn(R) = 1, since by assumption,
for each n, ρn(R) = 1. Thus, with P, we can write (2) as
P(ρn, I(xn)) = 1−P(ρn, I
c(xn)).
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Taking limit on both sides of this equation yields (if the limits exist)
lim
n→∞
P(ρn, I(xn)) = 1− lim
n→∞
P(ρn, I
c(xn)). (3)
If limn P(ρn, I(xn)) is a probability, so is limn P(ρn, I
c(xn)), such that
[
lim
n→∞
P(ρn, I(xn))
]
s
= lim
n→∞
I(xn) = R
[
lim
n→∞
P(ρn, I
c(xn))
]
s
= lim
n→∞
Ic(xn) =
⋂
n≥1
Ic(xn) = ∅
and (3) implies [
lim
n→∞
P(ρn, I(xn))
]
m
=
[
lim
n→∞
P(ρn, I
c(xn))
]
m
= ρ
with ρ(R ∪ ∅) = ρ(R) = 1. However, given that (ρn)n≥1 is not tight on (R,B(R)), we have ρ({∞}) > 0.
Consequently, ρ(R) = 1 implies
ρ(R) + ρ({∞}) = ρ(R) > 1
and hence violates the constraint imposed by the axioms of probability. As a probability measure
on B(R), ρ assigns unit mass to R. So limn P(ρn, I(xn)) is not a probability. Similarly, from mass
conservation on R in probability assignment given by ρ,
ρ(R) = ρ(R)− ρ({∞}) = P(ρ,R) = 1− ρ({∞}) < 1
follows immediately. 
8 The Inconsistency
Now we demonstrate the inconsistency of measure-theoretic probability. Let R be equipped with a
topology induced by a fixed metric (e.g., see Example 6). Let λ, µ, λn, µn, n = 1, 2, · · · be probability
measures on (R,B(R)), such that λ, λ1, λ2, · · · are distributions of i.i.d. random variables X,X1,X2, · · · ,
respectively, as given in Example 3, and µn are distributions of
Zn = max{i : Xi = Yn, i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n}} (4)
where
Yn = max{Xi : i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n}}. (5)
By (4), Zn, n = 1, 2, · · · form a non-decreasing random sequence (Zn)n≥1. As we can readily see, for
each n, the probability mass function of Zn is given by (1) in Example 4. As n → ∞, Zn converges
in distribution to an extended random variable Z. Equivalently, µn ⇒ µ, i.e., µn converges weakly to
µ induced by Z. As a probability measure on B(R), µ is the Dirac measure concentrated at {∞}, i.e.,
µ({∞}) = 1. However, when restricted to B(R), µ is a subprobability measure with µ(R) = 0. As
shown in Example 3 and Example 4, (λn)n≥1 is tight on (R,B(R)) but (µn)n≥1 is not (see Sections 4
and 5). By (4) and (5),
Zn ≤ n (6)
and
XZn = Yn. (7)
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For the random sequences (Xn)n≥1 and (Yn)n≥1, a probability measure P can be defined on the
measurable space (RT ,B(RT )) where T = {1, 2, · · · }. This probability measure P can also express
probabilities given by the distribution µn induced by Zn for each n. However, as shown in Section 3,
no probability measure can be defined on (RT ,B(RT )) to capture the impact of the infinite limit of
(Zn)n≥1 on limiting probabilities given by µ.
In contrast, for the notion of weak convergence, probability spaces which are the domains of the
involved random variables can all be distinct. The domain spaces are not essential, and actually remain
offstage [4, 7]. So we can focus on the probability measures and their weak limits, as long as the range
space and the topology on it are the same for all the random variables involved [4]. The weak limit of
λn is trivially λ, i.e., λn ⇒ λ with λ({0}) = 1/2. However, the following theorem is also provable.
Theorem 1 For λn given in Example 3, λn ⇒ λ with λ({0}) = µ(R) = 0.
Proof: By (6),
λn({0}) = P(Xn = 0) = P(Xn = 0, Zn < n) + P(Xn = 0, Zn = n). (8)
Consider the limiting probabilities on both sides of (8). We first show limn P(Xn = 0, Zn = n) = 0.
lim
n→∞
P(Xn = 0, Zn = n)
= lim
n→∞
P(XZn = 0, Zn = n)
= lim
n→∞
P(Yn = 0, Zn = n) (by (7))
= 0. (9)
The last equality follows from P(limn→∞ Yn = 1) = 1,
{Yn = 0, Zn = n} ⊂ {Yn = 0}, P(Yn = 0, Zn = n) ≤ P(Yn = 0)
and
lim
n→∞
P(Yn = 0) = P

⋂
n≥1
{Yn = 0}

 (since {Yn = 0} ⊃ {Yn+1 = 0} as implied by (5)).
Similarly, from (8), (9), and
{Xn = 0, Zn < n} = {Zn < n}
we have
P{Xn = 0, Zn < n} = P{Zn < n} = µn(I(n − 1))
and
λ({0}) = lim
n→∞
λn({0}) = lim
n→∞
P(Xn = 0, Zn < n) = lim
n→∞
µn(I(n− 1)).
Since λ({0}) is a probability, so is limn µn(I(n− 1)), and
λ({0}) = lim
n→∞
µn(I(n− 1)) = P(µ,R) = µ(R) = 0
follows from Lemma 2(b) with xn = n− 1, ρn = µn and ρ({∞}) = µ({∞}) = 1. 
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Remark 3 By definition, “1/2” in the probability mass function “λ({0}) = 1/2” (see Example 3)
represents a (numerical) probability. In contrast, as explained in Example 4 and Example 11, “1/2”
in “limn[µ(I(n − 1))] = limn P(µn, I(n − 1)) = 1/2” is not a probability. As we have discussed in
Sections 6 and 7, without representing the value of a quantity in the physical world, a real number is
only a point in a set formulated by a system of axioms. It makes no sense at all to treat a probability,
which is a quantified attribute of an event in the physical world, as a point of a set, which is merely
a mathematical (or metaphysical) entity still considered questionable by some mathematicians even
nowadays [5, 9]. Since λ({0}) = limn µ(I(n− 1)) as shown in the proof of Theorem 1, and since λ({0})
is a probability, limn µ(I(n − 1)) must be a probability, and this probability is P(µ,R) = µ(R) = 0
by Lemma 2. Since “1/2” in “limn[µ(I(n − 1))] = limn P(µn, I(n − 1)) = 1/2” is a real number,
i.e., a point on the abstract real line R but not a probability, it is meaningless to equate λ({0}) with
limn[µ(I(n − 1))] = limn P(µn, I(n − 1)) (see also Example 8 and Example 9). 
9 Concluding Remarks
In general, the presupposition for questions of identity (expressed by “=”) in a theory is that the
two sides inquired about both belong to the same category [2]. An expression “x = y” where x and
y are in the same category but numerically different is erroneous only when the theory is proved to
be contradiction-free as requested by Hilbert. Unfortunately, according to Go¨del’s theorems, measure-
theoretic probability is one of the theories for which such a proof does not exist. Nevertheless, if one
side of “=” is a probability, then the other side must also be a probability. This requirement is necessary
to prevent confusion of probabilities and arbitrarily calculated numbers which are not eligible to serve
as probabilities. Whether a number is eligible to serve as a probability is determined by whether the
number is the result of applying a probability measure to a measurable set in the context. In particular,
when we calculate limiting probabilities, the two sides of “=” must both be limiting probabilities. Since
procedures for calculating limits of real sequences may not necessarily yield limiting probabilities, the
limit of a real sequence which is not a probability is irrelevant to whatever implied by calculations of
limiting probabilities.
Consider limn µn(I(n − 1)) (see the proof of Theorem 1). The probability measures µn and the
associated measurable sets I(n − 1) approach their respective limits simultaneously. This implies two
different orders of operations for calculating limn µn(I(n− 1)):
(a) taking the limits of the probability measures µn and the measurable sets I(n− 1) simultaneously
first, then applying the limiting measure µ to the limiting measurable set R, i.e.,
lim
n→∞
µn(I(n − 1)) = P(µ,R) = µ(R)
(b) applying the measures µn to the corresponding measurable sets I(n − 1) to obtain a sequence
(µn(I(n − 1)))n≥1 of numbers first, then taking the limit of the real sequence, i.e.,
lim
n→∞
µn(I(n− 1)) = lim
n→∞
P(µn, I(n − 1)).
Order (a) produces a probability, but order (b) yields a number which is not a probability (see Example
11). So the meaning of limn µn(I(n − 1)) is ambiguous.
Since limn µn(I(n − 1)) can only be written as a “linear” string of symbols, such a “linear” way of
writing might result in an impression as if (b) were the only option for calculating limn µn(I(n − 1)).
However, when standing in the relation “=” to a probability (i.e., λ({0})), limn µn(I(n− 1)) has to be
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calculated according to (a) rather than (b) to yield a probability as well, for the two sides of “=” must
both be probabilities, even if they are numerically different. As we have demonstrated, “two numerically
different probabilities equal each other” is a provable statement, which shows that measure-theoretic
probability is inconsistent.
The revealed contradiction of measure-theoretic probability does not exist in the physical world. It
appears only in the theory. Practical applications of measure-theoretic probability will not be affected
by the inconsistency as long as ideal events in the theory are not mistaken for real events in the physical
world. On the other hand, the inconsistency of measure-theoretic probability cannot be explained away,
and must be resolved. Constructive mathematics (e.g., see [5, 9]) can avoid such inconsistency. There
is no contradiction reported in constructive mathematics.
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